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Abstract—Operational and security requirements for RFID
systems such as system scalability, anonymity and anti-cloning
are difﬁcult to obtain due to constraints in area, memory,
etc. Due to scarceness of resources most of the proposed
protocols were designed using symmetric key cryptographic
algorithms. However, it has been shown that it is inevitable
to use public-key cryptographic algorithms to satisfy these
requirements [1]. Moreover, general public-key cryptography
based authentication protocols are vulnerable in terms of
anonymity, which is shown in this paper. Accordingly, we
design a new authentication protocol named EC-RAC using
EC (Elliptic Curve) cryptography. EC-RAC can be proved for
its security in the generic group model and is carefully designed
to minimize its computational workload. Moreover, we present
the implementation results of EC-RAC to show its feasibility
for RFID systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
RFID (Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation) systems are one
of the most challenging devices recent years in many ﬁelds
such as wireless communication, circuit and electromagnetic
areas. The reason is that there are so many potential or
ongoing applications of RFID systems such as supply chains,
livestock/inventory tracking, toll management, airline bag-
gage management, access control and so on. It can also
be used to discriminate between counterfeits and authentic
products. Especially since the adoption of EPCglobal Gen2
[2], the RFID is expected to completely replace the bar code
systems in near future.
For commercial markets, RFID systems should overcome
not only the restriction of cheap RFID tags but also opera-
tional and security problems such as scalability, the tracking
problem and the cloning problem. In many cases, the security
part is simpliﬁed in order to minimize a tag’s price. For
example, Class-1 EPCglobal Gen2 [2] has a very simple
authentication scheme where a password is transmitted in
a plain text, which can cause many security problems.
Fortunately, the CMOS technologies steadily advance and
the fabrication costs decrease, which allows stronger security
solutions on tags. Moreover, some applications such as
expensive goods and access control systems that should be
highly secured can afford more expensive tags which may
include more resources such as an extra power source, gate
area and memory.
First, we summarize some essential operational and cryp-
tographic properties for general RFID systems in order to
clarify the issues of the paper.
• Scalability:
If the computational workload of an authentication
protocol increases linearly as the number of the tags,
the system is not scalable. Noting that most RFID
applications should accommodate a large number of
tags, e.g. a large library may have millions of books
and each book should have a tag, the scalability is a
critical property in RFID systems.
• Anti-cloning:
Since a large number of tags will be spread out in the
RFID applications, an attacker may be able to capture
a tag, investigate it by microscope probing [4], learn
all the information in the tag, and make a counterfeit.
However, an attacker should not be able to forge other
tags except the cracked one. If a group of tags share
secret information and a reader authenticates tags by
the shared secret, it will be possible to clone some
other tags with the learned secret. This will also cause
the tracking problem since an attacker can decrypt the
exchanged messages. Therefore, the secret information
on a tag should be pertinent to the tag so that the other
tags except the cracked one are still secure.
One possible way to protect the secret stored in a tag is
to use a secure memory [5]. However, it is not practical
to store a long-term secret (a group key, shared secret
among a group of tags and readers) in tags and to use
it for authentication since only single cracked tag may
endanger all the tags and readers having the shared
secret.
In this paper, assuming that an attacker is able to crack
and reveal the secret in a tag, we deﬁne an RFID system
secured against the cloning attack as long as the secret
of a tag is pertinent to the tag and secured from passive
or active skimming attacks.
• Anonymity:
RFID tags are supposed to respond with some message
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whenever they receive a query message from a reader.
If the responses are ﬁxed or predictable by an attacker,
it results in a privacy problem. An attacker is possibly
able to track a tag, and hence its owner too, and collect
data for malicious purpose. Therefore, the responses of
tags should be randomized so that it is infeasible to
extract any information in communications between a
tag and a reader.
Some of the proposed authentication protocols use hash
algorithms and/or symmetric key algorithms due to their
simplicity compared to public-key algorithms. However, they
fail to satisfy the mentioned basic requirements of RFID
systems. This is consequential noting the proof in [1], where
it is shown that a public-key cryptographic algorithm is
necessary to satisfy the required properties. Some other
propose to adopt well-known public-key based authentication
protocols such as the Schnorr protocol [19] and the Okamoto
protocol [20], which are suitable for general authentication
systems that do not concern anonymity but not for RFID
systems.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
1) The security against the tracking attack is formalized.
The deﬁnition is general and covers not only passive
attacks but also active attacks.
2) Based on the security deﬁnition, we analyze the secu-
rity of some well-known ECDLP based authentication
protocols and show that they are vulnerable to the
tracking attack.
3) We propose a new authentication protocol named EC-
RAC and formally prove its security in the generic
group model.
4) We present the implementation results of EC-RAC to
show that it is also feasible for high-end tags.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Sec. 2, some related work is introduced, and in Sec. 3,
the security of ECDLP based authentication protocols of
Schnorr and Okamoto is analyzed. EC-RAC is proposed and
its security is analyzed in Sec. 4 and Sec. 5 respectively.
We present the implementation results of EC-RAC in Sec. 6
followed by the conclusion in Sec. 7.
II. RELATED WORK ON RFID AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOLS
Many protocols have been proposed for RFID systems
using a hash algorithm due to their cheap implementations
[6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [13], [14], [15]. Some other protocols
using secret key cryptographic algorithms are also proposed
in [11], [12]. These protocols are divided into ﬁxed access
control and randomized access control. Randomized access
control again can be divided based on whether a system-wide
common secret key (a group key) is used or not. However,
they could not satisfy some of the basic operational and/or
security requirements of RFID systems.
In the ﬁxed access control, e.g. [6], a tag replies to a reader
with a ﬁxed message so that the protocol can be designed
with simple cryptographic primitives, which allows a cheap
price of tags. However, this kind of protocols is vulnerable
to the tracking attack due to the constant responses of tags.
A solution to prevent the tracking problem is the ran-
domized access control. In order to randomize messages,
a reader and a tag need to share some secret information
which is unknown to attackers so that only the entities which
have the secret information can interpret the randomized
messages. Without using a group key, randomized access
controls are not scalable since the workload of the reader
increases linearly as the number of the tags. Some protocols
of this type are presented in [6], [9]. Protocols proposed
in [7], [10] resolve the tracking problem and the scalability
by sharing a group key among all the readers and the tags.
However, they neglect the possibility of the compromised
group key. Once the group key is revealed by cracking a
tag, all the tags of the system will be vulnerable to not only
the cloning attack but also the tracking attack.
Some protocols have been proposed to solve the tracking
problem and scalability with hash algorithms [13], [14], [15].
This is done by updating the stored information in tags
regularly. However, they still have some drawbacks. In [13],
the keys of tags are updated only when the authentication
protocols are successful, and hence all the response from ma-
licious queries, which lead unsuccessful authentications, will
be ﬁxed until the next successful authentication. Therefore,
between two consecutive successful authentications, tags are
vulnerable to the tracking attack. In [14], [15], tags are
vulnerable to the denial-of-service attack since tags updates
their key or local information regardless of the success of
the protocols.
There are some proposals to use asymmetric cryptographic
algorithms for RFID systems. In [1], an IFP (Integer Factor-
ization Problem) based protocol is proposed. In [16], [17],
[18] they proposed to use ECDLP (Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem) based authentication protocols for RFID
systems, which will be analyzed in the following section.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF ECDLP BASED
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
Some attempts to apply elliptic curve cryptography to
RFID systems are done in [16], [17], [18]. In [16] no spe-
ciﬁc authentication protocol is mentioned, and the Schnorr
protocol [19] and the Okamoto protocol [20] are adopted in
[17] and [18] respectively. These two protocols are two of
the most popular authentication protocols based on ECDLP
(Elliptic Curve discrete Logarithm Problem). However, they
are not proper for RFID systems since they are designed
without considering anonymity. In these protocols, it is
conventionally assumed that the ID (or public key) of a
prover (a tag) is already known to a veriﬁer (a reader or a
server). However, transmitting ID’s in secret is a main goal
in the RFID authentication protocol. Even if we assume a
tag’s ID is conveyed to a reader securely, they still have the
tracking problem.
In order to discuss the issue of the tracking attack, we
put forward a formal deﬁnition for the security against the
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tracking attack which is very strong since it can be applied
to not only passive attacks but also active attacks.
Deﬁnition 1: An authentication protocol is secure against
the tracking attack if the following polynomial time oracle
does not exist.
Q (param1, param2, ..., paramm) (1)
= ˜f(varT1 , var
T
2 , ..., var
T
n )
where {param1, param2, ..., paramm} is the set of the
known values such as exchanged messages and possibly
revealed values to an attacker, and {varT1 , varT2 , ..., varTn }
is the set of variables which can indicate a speciﬁc tag such
as a tag’s secret and public keys. The function ˜f(•) can be
any polynomial time function whose output includes at least
one variable indicating a speciﬁc tag and does not include
any random variable.
Conceptually, the deﬁnition states that deriving any ﬁxed
value indicating a speciﬁc tag must be infeasible. In the
remainder of this section, some ECDLP-based authentication
protocols are introduced and the deﬁnition is applied to these
protocols to show their vulnerability against the tracking
attack.
A. The Schnorr Protocol
• Prover’s private key: x
• Prover’s public key: X(= −xP )
Veriﬁer(Server) Prover(Tag)
r1 ∈R Z
R1ﬀ R1 ← r1P
r2 ∈R Z r2 
If vP + r2X = R1
then accept
vﬀ v ← xr2 + r1
Fig. 1. The Schnorr Protocol
The message ﬂow of the Schnorr protocol is shown in
Fig. 1 where r1 and r2 are random numbers generated by a
prover (tag) and a veriﬁer (reader/server) respectively. The
prover’s secret key is x and its public key is X = −xP . If
vP + r2X = R1 at the end of the protocol ﬂow, then the
veriﬁer accepts the prover, else rejects.
If we apply Deﬁnition 1 to the Schnorr protocol, the
parameters of Q are the exchanged messages, i.e. r1P , r2
and xr2+r1, and the system parameter, i.e. P . A polynomial
time oracle can be deﬁned as follows.
Q (r1P, r2, xr2 + r1, P ) (2)
= {r1P − (xr2 + r1) · P} · r−12 = −xP
−xP satisﬁes the requirements of ˜f(•) since there is a
variable x which can be an indication of a tag and there
is no random variable such as r1 and r2. Therefore, the
Schnorr protocol is not secure against the tracking attack
since a polynomial time oracle deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1 exists.
In other words, an attacker can track a tag by deriving −xP .
B. The Okamoto Protocol
• Prover’s private key: x1 and x2
• Prover’s public key: X(= −x1P1 − x2P2)
Veriﬁer(Server) Prover(Tag)
r1, r2 ∈R Z
Rﬀ R← r1P1 + r2P2
r ∈R Z r 
v1 ← r1 + rx1
If v1P1 + v2P2 +
rX = R then ac-
cept
v1, v2ﬀ v2 ← r2 + rx2
Fig. 2. The Okamoto Protocol
The Okamoto protocol is described in Fig. 2 where r1 and
r2 are random numbers generated in a prover and r is in a
veriﬁer. The secret key of the prover is a pair of x1 and x2
and its public key is X = −x1P1−x2P2. After ﬁnishing the
message exchanges, the veriﬁer accepts the prover if v1P1+
v2P2 + rX = R, otherwise reject.
The Okamoto protocol also has the tracking problem since
a polynomial oracle of Deﬁnition 1 can be described with
the following equation.
Q (r1P1 + r2P2, r, r1 + rx1, r2 + rx2, P1, P2)
= {R− v1P1 − v2P2} r−1 (3)
= {(r1P1 + r2P2)− (r1 + rx1)P1 − (r2 + rx2)P2} r−1
= {−rx1P1 − rx2P2} r−1 = −x1P1 − x2P2.
Note that the parameters of Q are the exchanged mes-
sages and the system parameters. The output of the oracle
(−x1P1 − x2P2) is the public key of a tag and it satisﬁes
the conditions of Deﬁnition 1 since it has some variables
indicating a speciﬁc tag, i.e. x1 and x2, and does not hvae
any random variable.
To summarize, the conventional ECDLP based authenti-
cation protocols shown in this section are not suitable for
RFID systems. Therefore, we need a new RFID protocol that
considers not only secure transmissions of a tag’s identity but
also the tracking attack.
IV. EC-RAC PROTOCOL
To solve all the requirements for RFID systems, we design
a new RFID protocol based on the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem. Among public-key cryptographic algo-
rithms, a ECC based algorithm would be the best choice due
to its small key size and computational efﬁciency. Moreover,
when a protocol is designed, the computational workload
on tags should be minimized. This may cause an increase
of the workload of the server (or reader). Since the server
is supposed to have sufﬁcient resources such as power and
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• Veriﬁer’s input: y, X1(= x1P ), x1, X2(= x2P )
• Prover’s input: x1, x2, Y (= yP )
Veriﬁer(Server) Prover(Tag)
r2 ∈R Z r1 ∈R Z
r2 
If r2 = 0 then halt, else
T1 ← r1P , T2 ← (r1 + x1)Y ,
y−1T2 − T1 = (r1 + x1)P − r1P = x1P T1, T2, vﬀ v ← r1x1 + r2x2
(Look up x1 and X2 paired with x1P )
If (vP − x1T1)r−12 = X2 then accept
else reject
Fig. 3. EC-RAC Protocol Flow
1) Tag and Server generate random numbers r1 and r2 respectively.
2) Server sends r2 to Tag.
3) If r2 = 0 then stop the protocol. Otherwise Tag generates and sends three messages T1 = r1P , T2 = (r1 + x1)Y
and v = r1x1 + r2x2 to Server.
4) Server calculates y−1T2−T1 = y−1(r1+x1)yP−r1P = x1P = X1 and using the result (X1) searches for x1 and
X2. If there is a valid set for X1, Server calculates (vP − x1T1)r−12 = {(r1x1 + r2x2)P − x1r1P} r−12 = x2P
and check whether it is the same as the stored X2. If it is, Server authenticates Tag as a valid one.
Fig. 4. EC-RAC Protocol Description
memory compared to tags, transferring the workload of tags
to the server is desirable if it is possible.
Before designing the EC-RAC protocol, we should note
that RFID systems have different situations from conven-
tional password systems and public-key cryptography based
authentication systems as the following:
1) Unlike conventional password protocols, RFID sys-
tems should not just transfer a tag’s ID.
2) Unlike conventional public-key cryptography based
authentication protocols, the protocols are many to
one protocols, i.e. many RFID tags communicate with
one reader/server. Due to this property, tags’ public
keys do not need to be publicly announced and hence,
they can and should be securely stored and used for
authentications in the server.
Similarly to conventional password protocols which re-
quire two values for each prover, i.e. ID and Password, our
protocol starts with two secret keys, x1 and x2, which are
compatible to ID and Password. The public keys, x1P and
x2P , are used as ID-veriﬁer and Password-veriﬁer which are
securely stored in the server unlike general public keys.
The protocol ﬂow and the description are shown in Fig. 3
and Fig. 4 respectively. The EC (Elliptic Curve) point scalar
multiplication is the critical operation in the protocol. While
a server needs 3 scalar multiplications, a tag needs only 2
scalar multiplications. It is desirable to reduce the workload
in a tag even if it increases the computational workload
in a server. Another noticeable thing is that general EC
point additions/subtractions and scalar inverse operations are
avoided in a tag while they are not in a server. This results
in a minimized control and gate area on a tag.
In this protocol, it is assumed that a server stores y, X1(=
x1P ), x1 and X2(= x2P ), and a tag stores x1, x2 and Y (=
yP ). During the protocol ﬂow the ID (x1) and Password
(x2) of a tag are encrypted for the transmission to a server.
After decrypting X1(= x1P ), the server searches for x1 and
X2(= x2P ) paired with X1 and verify that X2 is correct by
checking whether (vP − x1T1)r−12 = X2.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In order to analyze the security of EC-RAC, we use the
generic group model [21], [22], [23]. In this model, an
attacker does not have access to group elements but to the
images of the group elements, which are one-to-one mapped
to random strings. For a given group G, the random mapping
of the group elements to the images can be described as
σ : G → {0, 1}l where l is the length of the random strings.
An attacker can perform an addition oracle Add, an inverse
oracle Inv and a scalar multiplication oracle for Mul for
the group operations as follows.
Add(σ(x), σ(y)) = σ(x + y)
Inv(σ(x)) = σ(−x) (4)
Mul(k, σ(y)) = σ(k · y)
Mul is redundant since it can be easily implemented by
a polynomial time algorithm using Add, e.g. a scalar mul-
tiplication can be implemented with the double and add
algorithm where the doubling and the addition can be done
by Add.
When the generic group model is instantiated on an EC
group, group elements x and y can be considered as scalar
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values, and σ(x) and σ(y) as x · P and y · P where P
is the base point. The generic group model ensures that an
attacker has no gain at deriving the group element x from
σ(x), i.e. x · P , which means that there is no efﬁcient (or
polynomial time) algorithm which derives scalar values from
EC points. This fact will be used when we analyze the EC-
RAC protocol. In this paper, we use naive forms of EC points
such as x · P instead of using σ(x) and hence assume that
x · P is a randomly mapped string just like σ(x).
The security proof is done by contradiction as the fol-
lowing procedure. We use the fact that the Difﬁe-Hellman
scheme [24] is secure in the generic group model, which is
already proven in [21].
1) We assume that the protocol is un-secure and then there
exists a polynomial time oracle Q which calculates
some secrete information in polynomial time with
publicly known or possibly revealed values.
2) We show that the oracle Q deﬁned in step 1 can be
reduced to another oracle which is obviously impossi-
ble to solve or to the Difﬁe-Hellman problem. If the
oracle Q is reduced to the Difﬁe-Hellman problem,
the existence of such Q implies that Difﬁe-Hellman
problem is solvable in polynomial time.
3) By contradiction, the proof of the security is done.
We analyze the security in three different settings: at-
tacking as a third observer, attacking as a valid server and
attacking as a valid tag. Moreover, we analyze the security
against the tracking attack. In the analysis, we assume that
x1, x2 and y are randomly chosen.
A. Security Analysis Against an Attacker as a Third Ob-
server
In this sub-section, we prove that a third observer cannot
extract any secret information, i.e. x1, x1P , x2, x2P , y, and
yP . As a start of the security proof, we assume the worst
case: all the exchanged messages between tags and the
server are revealed and collected for an attacking purpose;
all the system parameters including P , and yP are also
publicly known by cracking a tag. Note that even if we
assume that yP is known, checking whether the system
is actually using the same yP or a different one must be
infeasible. Leaking yP may not be a problem in general
public-key cryptographic systems since it is a public key.
However, in some RFID applications such as supply chains,
the public key of the server can be an indication of a
product’s brand name which is also private information.
• Security for x1P (and hence for x1) :
Note that the security of x1P is a sufﬁcient condition of
the security of x1. This is because if x1 is compromised, x1P
can also be calculated. We assume there is a polynomial time
oracle Q which calculates x1P .
Q (r2, r1P, (r1 + x1)yP, r1x1 + r2x2, yP, P ) = x1P
In order to utilize r1x1 + r2x2, we need to convert this
parameter to an EC point by multiplying by an EC point
(Though we can do some scalar operations before converting
to an EC point, there is no meaningful operations considering
that there is only one more scalar parameter, r2). Note that in
the generic group model, the allowed group operations for
an attacker are the point addition and the point inversion.
Therefore, each term of EC points must be considered to
be independent, e.g. r1P and r1x1P are independent terms.
If r1x1 + r2x2 is multiplied by any EC point among the
given parameters, it generates one new parameter and two
new terms. For example, if r1x1 + r2x2 is multiplied by
r1P , the newly generated parameter is r21x1P + r1r2x2P ,
and the newly generated terms are r21x1P and r1r2x2P .
Therefore, it generates more terms than parameters, which
means converting r1x1 + r2x2 to an EC point does not help
for solving x1P . Therefore, we can eliminate r1x1 + r2x2
without losing generality. r2 also can be eliminated since
r1x1 + r2x2 is the only parameter having r2. Actually, it
does not help for any term of EC points, and hence, we
exclude r1x1 + r2x2 and r2 when we need to derive an EC
point throughout this paper.
Therefore, Q is simpliﬁed as follows.
⇒ Q (r1P, (r1 + x1)yP, yP, P ) = x1P (5)
We reduce the oracle to Q′ by assuming that r1 is known.
⇒ Q′ (r1P, (r1 + x1)yP, yP, P, r1) = x1P
Q′ is simpliﬁed noting that r1P · r−11 = P and (r1 +
x1)yP − r1 · yP = x1yP .
⇒ Q′ (x1yP, yP, P, r1) = x1P
Since r1 is no more relevant to this problem, we eliminate
it.
⇒ Q′ (x1yP, yP, P ) = x1P
This can be reduced to the Difﬁe-Hellman scheme as
follows, which is shown in Theorem 1.
Q′′ (x1P, yP, P ) = x1yP
The existence of Q′′ conﬂicts with the fact that the Difﬁe-
Hellman scheme is secure in the generic group model.
Therefore, security for x1P is proven by contradiction.
Theorem 1: If a polynomial time oracle Q(xyP, yP, P ) =
xP exists, then a polynomial time oracle Qˆ(xP, yP, P ) =
xyP exists. Equivalently, if there is no polynomial time
oracle Qˆ(xP, yP, P ) = xyP (i.e. the Difﬁe-Hellman scheme
is secure), then there is no a polynomial time oracle of
Q(xyP, yP, P ) = xP .
Proof: We assume that a polynomial time oracle
Q(xyP, yP, P ) = xP exists. Then, since Q(xP, yP, P ) =
Q(xy−1 · yP, yP, P ) = xy−1P , the following oracle Qˆ can
be equivalently derived as follows.
Qˆ(xP, yP, P )
⇒ Qˆ(xP, yP, xy−1P, P )
Again, since Q(xP, xy−1P, P ) = Q(y−1 · xP, xP, P ) =
y−1P ,
⇒ Qˆ(xP, yP, xy−1P, y−1P, P )
Since Q(xP, y−1P, P ) = Q(xy · y−1P, y−1P, P ) = xyP ,
the following oracle exists.
⇒ Qˆ(xP, yP, P ) = xyP
Therefore, the theorem is proven.
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• Security for x2P (and hence for x2) :
We reuse Eq. (5) where the oracle is simpliﬁed. In this
time we need to derive x2P .
Q (r1P, (r1 + x1)yP, yP, P ) = x2P
Since there is no parameter having x2, it is impossible to
derive x2P with the given parameters.
• Security for yP :
Even if we assume that yP is already revealed, the
information indicating whether a tag is actually using the
same yP or not should be secured. Among the exchanged
messages, only the message including y is (r1+x1)yP . This
security can be proved by showing that deriving (r1+x1)yP
with other known values is infeasible.
First, we assume there is a polynomial time oracle which
generates (r1 + x1)yP as follows.
Q (r2, r1P, r1x1 + r2x2, yP, P ) = (r1 + x1)yP
Since r2 and r1x1 + r2x2 are useless for deriving (r1 +
x1)yP , we eliminate them.
⇒ Q (r1P, yP, P ) = (r1 + x1)yP
Now there is no parameter left which includes x1 which
should be used for deriving the output (r1 + x1)yP .
Therefore, it is impossible to derive (r1 +x1)yP , and hence
the security proof of this part is done.
• Security for y :
We assume there is a polynomial time oracle which
calculates y.
Q (r2, r1P, (r1 + x1)yP, r1x1 + r2x2, yP, P ) = y
Since the EC points are no use to derive a scalar value in
the generic group model, we eliminate all EC points.
⇒ Q (r2, r1x1 + r2x2) = y
Since there is no parameter left having y, there is no way
to derive y.
B. Security Analysis Against an Attacker as a server
We assume that a server is cracked and all the information
in the server is known to an attacker. Therefore, x1 (and
hence x1P ), x2P and y (and hence yP ) are revealed. Even
if a server is cracked, the attacker should not be able to get
the secret information of x2. This will prevent an attacker
from duplicating some tags after hacking a server. Now the
secret information known for an attacker is x1, x2P and y
and we need to show the security of x2.
• Security for x2 :
We assume there is a polynomial time oracle which
calculates x2.
Q (r2, r1P, (r1 + x1)yP, r1x1 + r2x2, y, x1, x2P, P ) = x2
Since the output is a scalar, we eliminate all EC points.
⇒ Q (r2, r1x1 + r2x2, y, x1) = x2
Q has no more use of y, so we eliminate it.
⇒ Q (r2, r1x1 + r2x2, x1) = x2
In this oracle, x2 cannot derived since r1 cannot be
removed from r1x1 + r2x2.
C. Security Analysis Against an Attacker as a tag
In this case, we assume that a tag is cracked and all the
information stored in the tag is revealed by an attacker. In
this situation, we prove that the other secret information is
secure. Therefore, r1, x1 (and x1P ), x2 (and x2P ) and yP
are known. Now the secret information we need to protect
is y.
• Security for y :
Q (r2, r1P, (r1 + x1)yP, r1x1 + r2x2, yP, P, r1, x1, x2)
= y
We eliminate all EC points.
⇒ Q (r2, r1x1 + r2x2, r1, x1, x2) = y
There is no more parameter having y left. Therefore,
deriving y is impossible and the security for y is proven.
D. Security Against the tracking attack
Against the tracking attack, securing the secret information
is not sufﬁcient. In Sec. 3 we analyzed the Schnorr protocol
and the Okamoto protocol. Those protocols are secure in
terms of not leaking secret keys. However, an attacker can
derive their public keys by manipulating the exchanged
messages. Using the derived public key of a tag, an attacker
can track the tag.
In the case of the proposed EC-RAC, let us suppose a
polynomial time oracle Q exists as follows. The parameters
of Q not only include the exchanged messages, i.e. r2,
r1P , (r1 + x1)yP and r1x1 + r2x2, but also include some
information which can be extracted by cracking a tag, i.e.
yP and P . Note that it is impossible to prevent the tracking
of already cracked tags. In this paper, we show that even if
an attacker is able to extract the secret information inside of
tags by cracking, the other un-cracked tags are still secure.
Moreover, we assume r2 can be controlled by an attacker.
It is possible that an attacker disguise as a reader so that
r2 may not be a random number but a certain constant. (At
least, we suppose r2 = 0. Therefore, a tag should proceed
the protocol only when r2 = 0.) Considering this worst case,
˜f(•) is allowed to include r2. Therefore, the output of ˜f(•)
must include x1 or x2 and must not include only r1. In order
to make it clear, we substitute r2 with k.
Q (k, r1P, (r1 + x1)yP, r1x1 + kx2, yP, P ) = ˜f(•)
There are two possible forms of the output of ˜f(•), which
are a scalar and an EC point.
• Suppose the output of ˜f(•) is a scalar.
Then, we can eliminate all the parameters of an EC point.
⇒ Q (k, r1x1 + kx2) = ˜f(•)
Now r1x1 + kx2 is the only parameter which includes
some information of a tag. However, it is impossible to
eliminate r1 from r1x1 + kx2 with the given parameters.
Therefore, the output of ˜f(•) is not a scalar.
• Suppose the output of ˜f(•) is an EC point.
Since the parameters k and r1x1+kx2 are useless deriving
an EC point, we eliminate them.
Q′ (r1P, (r1 + x1)yP, yP, P ) = ˜f(•)
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Since (r1 +x1)yP is the only parameter having x1 or x2,
we must derive ˜f(•) by manipulating (r1+x1)yP . The only
possible way to get rid of r1 is to derive r1yP and do the
calculation of (r1 + x1)yP − r1yP = x1yP . Therefore, the
problem is reduced to the following oracle Q′.
Q′ (r1P, (r1 + x1)yP, yP, P ) = r1yP
Since the number of the parameters are 4 and there are 5
terms (i.e. r1P , r1yP , x1yP , yP and P ), it is infeasible to
derive r1yP . Therefore, ˜f(•) cannot be an EC point either.
As a result, there is no polynomial time oracle Q which
produces ˜f(•), which means that the proposed EC-RAC is
secure against the tracking attack in the generic group model.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION FEASIBILITY
We show the performance results using the security pro-
cessor presented in [25] which is one of the most compact
architectures in the literature. The architecture is described
in Fig. 5, which is composed of the micro controller, the bus
manager and the ECP (Elliptic Curve Processor). ECP, which
computes EC point scalar multiplications, is composed of a
controller, MALU (Modular Arithmetic Logic Unit) and a
register ﬁle (whose size is 6×163 bits). In Fig. 5, the solid
lines are for data exchange, the dash lines with numbers
are for addressing, and the dash lines without numbers
are control signals. The processor can perform different
authentication protocols according to the programs stored in
its ROM.
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Fig. 5. RFID Processor Architecture [25]
The performance results of EC-RAC using this security
processor are summarized in Tab. I. The digit size speciﬁes
the digit size of the digit serial MALU. By increasing the
digit size, a higher performance can be achieved in the cost
of the gate area. The gate area includes everything inside of
the dash square in Fig. 5. The number of cycles includes
all the computations of EC-RAC, which includes two EC
scalar multiplications, two general modular multiplications,
two general modular additions, random number generation
and the data transmission/reception. The general modular
operations, i.e. r1 + x1 and r1x1 + r2x2, are performed in
the micro controller, and these computations can be done
in parallel with EC scalar multiplications if there is no data
dependency. In EC-RAC, all the general modular operations
can be performed during the ﬁrst EC scalar multiplication,
i.e. r1P , and hence the general modular operations does not
contribute to the total number of cycles. At the frequency
of 500 KHz, if the digit size is increased to 3 or more,
EC-RAC can be ﬁnished within 500 ms. 500 ms is a very
reasonable response time though it is too much delay for
sequential access of multiple tags. However, it is possible to
solve the throughput problem by applying a multiple access
protocol that can handel multiple tags in parallel. This is
possible because the most of the time taken in EC-RAC is
caused by the calculation inside of tags and therefore, if we
can make multiple tags start the authentication in parallel and
the radio communication of each tag exclusive, the overall
throughput can be effectively increased.
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE RESULTS OF EC-RAC
CMOS Digit Frequency Gates Cycles TimeSize [ms]
0.13μm
1
500KHz
15,619 554,343 1,109
2 17,145 291,579 584
3 17,703 202,753 406
4 18,262 157,617 316
5 18,820 131,825 264
The security processor of Fig. 5 needs extra ROM and
RAM. RAM stores data and a program. The data stores
system parameters, the public key of the server, the private
key of a tag and etc, and the program is for the ﬂow of the
EC-RAC protocol. RAM is used to store temporary and ﬁnal
results of the computations. The required ROM and RAM
sizes are summarized in Tab. II. The small sizes of required
memories are due to the specialized processor architecture
of [25].
TABLE II
REQUIRED MEMORIES FOR EC-RAC
Memory ROM for program ROM for data RAM
Size 58 bytes 126 bytes 128 bytes
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed the EC-RAC (ECDLP based Randomized
Access Control) protocol. Previously proposed protocols
using hash algorithms or symmetric key cryptographic al-
gorithms cannot satisfy the requirements of RFID systems
for scalability, tracking and cloning. In addition, well-known
ECDLP based authentication protocols are not suitable for
RFID systems not only because of the un-solved problem
about the secure transmission of a tag’s ID but also because
of vulnerability against the tracking attack.
The proposed EC-RAC protocol resolves all the require-
ments mentioned in this paper and is proved for its security in
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the generic group model. Moreover, the proposed protocol is
carefully designed to minimize the computational workload
of a tag. We also expect that the results of this work is
not limited to RFID systems but can be applied to other
authentication applications which are counting the tracking
problem.
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